People think Trump wants martial law? Ok, "Challenge Accepted."

As always, my admonition is this - "Skin that smoke wagon and see what happens."

The launch of the Trump Administration has caused many to freak out. I have to admit, I’ve never seen this much bureaucratic chaos unleashed. Even my colleagues who lived through what they call “Trump 1.0” are reeling from the flurry of executive orders and bureaucratic stumbles of the past fortnight.

Many on Substack tell me some version of this argument: “This is all designed to bring about civil unrest so they can declare martial law” (or invoke the Insurrection Act.)

My reply is always the same: “They can declare whatever they want, good luck enforcing it.”

That reply is always met with skepticism and shock.

I get it. People watch movies like “Civil War,” and they’re completely freaked out. I have to admit that when I saw that movie, the scenes of the Lincoln Memorial exploding, and the combat scenes in front of the White House were jarring. Almost caused me to stop watching. It’s not something that I’d like to think about.

I’ve been to the “sandbox” twice. I can’t say I liked it. I had to go as a DoD policy official. I was surrounded by combat infantry. It wasn’t something I’d want to do. War is ugly and violent; any idea to the contrary is a fantasy.

When you see our military on TV, you get the impression they can do anything.

The reality is that is not true.

While we have tremendous capability, our military is by design not an occupying force. We had a difficult time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we would have an imposisble time in our own country.

This post today is going to explore exactly why martial law isn’t possible. I’m going to show you exactly how difficult it would be to control the United States militarily. I’m going to assume every guardrail of our Republic is breached. I’m going to assume Congress completely falls apart. I’m going to assume norms completely hit the wall.

Despite all of that, I will also show you that martial law in the U.S. is next impossible.

Welcome to “Billy’s War College” & “Occupying the Crap Out of Countries” 101

So, before we jump in, I need to explain to all of you exactly how this all works. If you’re a field or flag officer, you’re welcome to skip all this and jump to the next section entitled “The Real Fear: Totalitarianism, Not Martial Law,” because you already know what I’m arguing, and you already know how impossible it is to occupy the United States.

For the rest of you having a nervous breakdown, you need to go to Billy’s War College.

This is “Occupying the crap out of countries” 101.

In discussing this class, I’m going to make the following assumptions.

The Constitution was burned to ashes. Nothing matters anymore.

I’m going to assume full military compliance. I’ll even assume, en arguendo, if you want, that the President is even able to raise an army big enough to attempt to try and impose martial law on the US (it really doesn’t matter as you’ll see, it fails in any event.)

I’m going to assume habeas corpus is gone, and the prohibitions against denial of life and liberty without due process are gone (in other words, people can get shot in the streets and detained without any warrant).

In other words, I’m going to assume a completely fascistic state. I’m going to assume your worst nightmare.

As you’ll see, it really doesn’t matter. Let’s jump into the coursework.

The Military Reality of Occupying an Area

Occupying an area from a military standpoint is one of the most complex and resource-intensive operations a force can undertake. It requires not just overwhelming force, but sustained logistical support, continuous security operations, and, perhaps most critically, a strategy for managing the local population. Now, I’m going to explore each one of those things in a bit more detail in other sections, but for the moment, I’m going to explain to you the “big picture” of how this all works so we’re all on the same page of how our military “thinks,” about occupation. Because when we’re talking about “martial law,” what we’re discussing is the military occupation of the United States from a military operation standpoint.

The U.S. military has extensive doctrine on this subject, drawn from historical experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and numerous other operations. However, even under the best circumstances, a successful occupation is far from guaranteed.

Establishing Control: The First Phase

The initial step in any occupation is establishing control. This means securing key infrastructure—government buildings, transportation hubs, energy facilities, and communication networks—while neutralizing any potential opposition (that would be a euphamistic way of describing killing people like you and me who might resist all of this “martial lawing” going on. Remember - I’m assuming the law goes out the window entirely in this exercise, the Constitution is basically torched, and the right of denial of life without due process of law is gone. So it’s “game on,” in its entirety - it’s us versus the government.)

In a hostile environment, this requires large numbers of troops to clear and hold territory. The military must ensure that enemy forces are either destroyed, disarmed, or driven underground, preventing them from mounting an effective resistance.

A fundamental challenge at this stage is the sheer size of the territory in question. Military doctrine emphasizes that for effective occupation, a force must maintain a sufficient troop-to-population ratio to enforce order. Historically, the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual suggests a ratio of at least 20 security personnel per 1,000 civilians. In a city of 1 million people, that means a minimum of 20,000 troops—just to maintain basic order.

If the U.S. were to attempt to occupy its own population, it would require millions of troops, a number the military simply does not have.

My estimate is that you would need a minimum of 200 combat divisions. That’s a minimum of 20 million men in combat arms divisions. By “combat arms,” I’m talking about guys with guns, tanks, mechanized troops, etc., I’m not talking medical corpsmen, logistics guys, cooks., or other supplies and logistics personnel. The United States has not had a force that large since the Second World War. When we get to the following sections, you’ll see how big our military actually is today. Spoiler alert - it’s way smaller than 200 combat divisions.

Denying Enemy Freedom of Movement: The Battle Never Ends

Once control is established, the military must prevent enemy forces—whether insurgents, organized militias, or even everyday civilians who refuse to comply—from regaining a foothold. This requires extensive security measures, including patrols, checkpoints, curfews, and electronic surveillance.

This phase is where occupations often falter. Insurgents, guerrilla fighters, and local populations rarely fight in conventional ways. Rather than direct confrontations, they use ambushes, sabotage, and hit-and-run tactics to weaken the occupying force. This is precisely what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, where even after securing major cities, the U.S. military struggled to maintain control due to persistent insurgent attacks.

I worked extensively on the field manuals regarding counter-insurgency with General Petreaus and his team when I was at DoD. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we faced essentially uneducated buffoons who lacked resources, training, and access to money, education, and equipment (by and large). Despite all of these problems, they still managed to kill our service members daily and forced the capitulation of our forces in a protracted conflict. We may not like to think about what happened that way - but that’s the fact, a fact I raised in meetings when I was in DoD when the “plus up,” was being discussed before Fallujah. The bottom line is we were involved in a protracted occupation in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and we weren’t doing an outstanding job in either. The fundamental reason why is pretty simple - it’s tough to convince the local population you’re their friend when a tank is standing on top of their house, and the local soldiers run around having gunfights with insurgents in your town.

In the case of the U.S., resistance would likely be even stronger. Unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, where the local population was largely unarmed, the U.S. has a massive civilian gun ownership rate, with over 400 million firearms in private hands. Our population is considerably more educated. And although many of our population feel poor, even the poorest among us is orders of magnitude wealthier than your average Iraqi or Afghani. Even if only a small fraction of the population actively resisted, the occupation force would be under exceptionally effective attack from a decentralized, well-armed, well-led, para-military force. (If for no other reason, people like me, flag officers, field officers, and others who have military and strategic training, and those who understand US doctrine, tactics, and strategy, would be a part of that resistance.)

(Another quick aside - we haven’t even discussed the idea of “allies” in this piece. The reality would be, those who stood against a dictatorship “Trump” would most certainly find NATO countries and much of the rest of the Western world ready to arm and support those factions. I feel exceptionally confident that France, Canada, Britain, Germany, the Danes, the Dutch, and the Scandanavian countries would back a militia movement in the United States attempting to resist a dictatorial imposition of fascist government by Trump if it was professionally led, had a political leadership structure that was seen as temperate and “legitimate,” say perhaps governor of a state or a collective of states, and that the coalition was fighting to restore the Republic. The US military fighting a well-armed para-military force that would be backed by air, sea, and military forces of NATO countries would find itself fighting an exceptionally dangerous conflict on its own soil. Now it’s not fighting small arms battles - but well-trained militia and exceptionally well-trained garrisoned combat armed troops armed with front-line weapons. Under those conditions, forcing a capitulation becomes a matter of “when” not “if.” The only wildcard in that scenario would be if “Dictator” Trump would use nuclear weapons against the countries allied with “the rebels.” That might be the only way to deter them. Even in that scenario, I would imagine then that would only stop those countries from putting “boots on the ground.” They would still provide unmarked forces, equipment, and support to attempt to topple the “Trump” regime.)

Uncle Sam’s War

People love to talk about Charlie Wilson’s War. It’s a great movie. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was supposed to be a quick stabilization mission—much like every great power’s miscalculation before it. The Red Army, one of the most powerful militaries in the world, marched into the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan believing they could crush the resistance and install a Soviet-friendly government in Kabul. They had the tanks, the helicopters, the artillery, the troops. The Mujahideen had little more than old rifles, local knowledge, and sheer determination.

And yet, ten years later, it was the Soviets who packed up and left in defeat.

Why? Because they ran into an enemy they couldn’t kill fast enough.

The American Pipeline: Weapons, Training, and Strategy

The Mujahideen didn’t win the war alone. They had help—from Washington, Islamabad, and Riyadh. The United States, through Operation Cyclone (what that covert operation was actually called), poured billions into training, arming, and supplying the Afghan resistance. It started small—bolt-action rifles, old Soviet weapons captured by allies, and surplus gear from past conflicts. But by the mid-1980s, the aid had evolved into something far more sophisticated.

• Stinger Missiles: The game-changer. Before 1986, Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopters terrorized Mujahideen fighters, raining down destruction with near impunity. Then came the FIM-92 Stinger—a shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missile that could take down a helicopter with one shot. Nearly 270 Soviet aircraft were lost to Stinger missiles, forcing the Soviets to scale back air operations and weakening their ability to support ground forces.

• Tactics & Training: The CIA, through Pakistan’s ISI, helped shape Mujahideen strategy. Fighters were taught to avoid direct combat, use ambushes, IEDs, and sabotage, and strike logistical targets rather than military strongholds. The goal wasn’t to destroy the Red Army in battle—it was to bleed them dry.

• Weapons & Money: Beyond missiles, the U.S. provided millions of rounds of ammunition, RPGs, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and explosives. American money funneled through Pakistan allowed for continuous recruitment and resupply, making it nearly impossible for the Soviets to pacify the country.

The Math of Defeat: You Don’t Need to Kill Everyone, Just Enough

The Soviets lost around 14,000 troops in Afghanistan over a decade. That’s a relatively small number when compared to World War II or even the Soviet losses in Stalingrad. But that number mattered because:

1. The Soviets couldn’t afford a drawn-out war.

2. The Afghan resistance was decentralized, impossible to crush completely.

3. Every loss eroded the will to continue the occupation.

The Mujahideen never needed to kill every Soviet soldier—they just needed to kill enough to make the war politically and economically unsustainable. In the end, the Soviet Union lost the war not because they were militarily overpowered, but because they couldn’t justify the cost.

Now Imagine Trying That in the United States

If 14,000 dead Soviet troops over a decade was enough to force one of the world’s superpowers to retreat, what would it take to make an occupying U.S. Army give up on controlling its own country?

• 400+ million privately owned firearms—more than any insurgent force in history.

• Hundreds of thousands of trained veterans, including former military, special operations, and law enforcement.

• Supply chains that can’t be controlled. Unlike Afghanistan, where fighters relied on smuggled American weapons, an American insurgency wouldn’t need external suppliers. The guns, the ammunition, the equipment—it’s already here.

• A vast landscape that can’t be locked down. Afghanistan’s mountains made occupation difficult. The U.S. is even bigger, with dense urban areas, sprawling rural landscapes, and countless logistical choke points that would make large-scale occupation impossible.

The Mujahideen bled the Soviets for ten years with far less firepower, less training, and fewer resources than the average American civilian already possesses. If a poorly equipped, loosely organized insurgency could make a superpower retreat, what do you think millions of armed, trained, and strategically minded citizens could do against an occupying force that was never designed to fight a war on home soil?

Which brings us to the next problem, logistics.

Sustaining Operations: A Logistics Nightmare

Guns start wars, but logistics win them. No military occupation can last without robust logistical support. Troops need food, fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, and transportation—all of which must be transported, stored, and distributed under combat conditions. The larger the occupied area, the more complicated this becomes. You cannot win a war or sustain an occupation “foraging” as you go.

U.S. military doctrine is built around expeditionary warfare, meaning its supply chains are designed for overseas conflicts. The Army, for example, operates vast global logistics networks, but those are built to supply forward-operating bases in foreign territories, not to sustain long-term domestic occupation. If an occupying force were dependent on domestic supply chains, resistance groups could target critical infrastructure—railways, highways, fuel depots, and food distribution centers—further stretching already strained resources.

Another overlooked factor is that not everyone in the logistics network will comply. Occupations rely on a certain level of cooperation from civilians—truckers, factory workers, warehouse managers—who run the supply lines. If these people refuse to work or, worse, actively sabotage the system (and it wouldn’t take many - only 2-3% to really harm the “war” effort,) then the occupation force faces an even greater crisis. This is why modern insurgencies often target infrastructure—because without supplies, an army collapses.

(Quick aside - And not to be obtuse about this, I don’t know if people understand who has the singular most influence in trucking industry in this country, but it’s not a group “pro-Trump,” (they didn’t back anyone in the last election) and certainly not a group that’s pro-Fascism. While the Teamsters aren’t what they used to be, they’re still the biggest single influencer in the trucking industry. If they decided to crash trucking in this country, logistics would stop. If they decided to slow things down, it would be just as bad. In other words, the movement of goods is integral to governance and supporting this “occupation” force, and so by extension, groups like the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO would be critical to supporting this “occupation.” It’s doubtful they’d be “all in,” in supporting a fascistic occupation of the United States. You never know, of course, until it happens, but it would be a truly remarkable twist of history if organized labor were to join forces with an autocrat to destroy the Constitution.)

Which brings us to the final problem, governance.

Managing Civil Affairs: The Challenge of Governance

One of the most challenging aspects of occupation is governing the occupied population. Military forces are not trained to function as police or government administrators on a large scale. When deployed domestically, even under martial law, they would be expected to handle public order, economic stability, legal disputes, and humanitarian needs—none of which are core military functions.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military struggled to maintain order not because of battlefield failures but because of administrative collapse. Even after winning tactical engagements, rebuilding infrastructure and enforcing governance proved nearly impossible. The longer an occupation lasts, the more it breeds resentment. Every checkpoint stop, every house search, every arbitrary enforcement action fuels local hostility. This creates an endless cycle where the occupation force must use more force to maintain order, which in turn fuels more resistance.

Applying this to the U.S., even if an occupation force initially succeeded in securing key cities, it would eventually run into the problem of governing a population that overwhelmingly does not want to be ruled by an occupying military. It wouldn’t take long before even those who were initially neutral would begin resisting simply out of frustration and anger.

Transitioning to Stability Operations: An Impossible Endgame

Military occupations are not supposed to be indefinite. Eventually, the occupying force must transition to stability operations—restoring governance, rebuilding infrastructure, and re-establishing normalcy. However, this assumes that the occupation successfully eliminated resistance and secured compliance, which, as seen in past occupations, rarely happens.

(Again, another quick aside - if you haven’t watched “War Machine” on Netflix, I can’t recommend it enough. I never knew Stan McChrystal. I did know some of the other characters who are “depicted” in this movie. I do find the movie overall to be a reasonable characterization of just how screwed up the whole endeavor in Afghanistan was. In the end, when we pulled out, as bad as that was, it was time to leave. Things always end badly, otherwise, they’d never end.)

In the case of the U.S., no clear exit strategy would exist. The longer the occupation drags on, the less legitimate it appears, and the more costly it becomes—both in dollars and lives. Over time, the occupying force itself would likely start experiencing desertion, morale collapse, and breakdowns in discipline as soldiers question why they are being ordered to suppress their own countrymen.

Congratulations on your Mini-”War College” training

Now you know how it works. This is how you occupy an area, and the pitfalls of doing it. I’ve just rushed you through the training that every field and flag officer gets in their war college studies. Now that we’re all on the same page as to how monumental of a task this truly is let’s examine our resources to conquer the United States, shall we?

The Composition and Mobilization of the U.S. Armed Forces

The U.S. military is often perceived as an unstoppable force, but in reality, it’s an expeditionary military, designed to project power abroad, not occupy its own country. Let’s break it down:

• The total active-duty force is about 1.3 million personnel, spread across six service branches.

• There are about 800,000 reservists and National Guard members, but these are largely part-time forces embedded in civilian communities.

• Within the Army, there are 11 active-duty combat divisions, but at best, only 3 to 4 divisions are at full strength at any given time.

• Each division has around 10,000 to 15,000 troops, but not all of them are combat troops—only about one-third are dedicated to combat roles like infantry and armor, while the rest handle logistics, intelligence, medical support, and administration.

At best, the number of troops available for actual enforcement would be 300,000 to 400,000, assuming a full mobilization without global commitments. Only about 150,000 could likely be assembled for a domestic operation. Compare this to historical counterinsurgency efforts—the U.S. struggled to control Baghdad with 150,000 troops, a city far smaller than any major American metropolitan area.

Now, compare these numbers to domestic law enforcement:

• The total number of law enforcement officers in the U.S. is around 700,000.

• This includes local police, county sheriffs, state troopers, and federal law enforcement agencies.

• Unlike the military, these officers are already embedded within their communities and have established local intelligence and logistical support.

The bottom line? The entire active-duty U.S. Army is smaller than the country’s police force. Any attempt to impose martial law would rely on a military that is already stretched thin, underprepared for occupation, and vastly outnumbered by armed civilians and local law enforcement alike.

Now remember, you need 20 million troops to pull this off. You have, at the moment, less than 400 thousand. A good chunk of those won’t even show up.

The Role of the National Guard and Reserves

The National Guard and Reserves are often cited as a backup force in such scenarios, but this argument collapses under scrutiny. Why? Because these forces come from the very communities they’d be tasked with controlling.

National Guard members are firefighters, paramedics, police officers, and sheriffs. Calling them up for martial law means pulling them away from essential local functions. While you might be strengthening the military’s presence, you’re simultaneously undermining local governance, public safety, and emergency services. In essence, you’re robbing Peter to pay Paul, and in doing so, you make the overall situation far more unstable.

I’m sure many of you go, but AHHH! Consription! He (the President) will just call his supporters, give them all guns, and there we go. The “Army of the MAGA!” is born. Ok, let’s talk about that - the “First Army of the MAGA.”

The Re-”MAGA-ican” Guard

Presuming the President attempted to suddenly deputize and arm millions of politically loyal supporters to create a personal military force, it would collapse before it even got started. Armies are not just masses of people with guns—they require extensive training, discipline, logistics, and command structures. The U.S. military spends months training even its most basic recruits, and even then, soldiers need continuous education, specialized instruction, and operational experience to function effectively. Simply handing out weapons to civilians and declaring them an army would produce nothing more than an undisciplined, disorganized mob that would be more of a danger to itself than to any opposing force.

Beyond training, the logistics of maintaining a 20-million-man force would be an absolute impossibility. The U.S. military, at full capacity, supports around 1.3 million active-duty troops with the help of one of the most advanced supply chains in history. Expanding that number to 20 million overnight would require exponential increases in food, fuel, ammunition, medical care, transportation, and housing—none of which could be produced or distributed at scale. Simply put, the infrastructure does not exist to sustain such a force. Even if weapons were available, ammunition stockpiles would run dry in weeks. There are only so many rounds, vehicles, and trained logistics officers in the country, and no system is in place to suddenly provide for an army of that size.

Additionally, the actual U.S. military would not go along with such a plan. The armed forces swear an oath to the Constitution, not to a president, and there are countless safeguards in place to prevent a standing military from becoming a political tool. The Pentagon, career officers, and the vast Department of Defense bureaucracy would resist any unlawful conscription or deputization effort—if not through outright refusal, then through bureaucratic stalling, internal sabotage, or direct legal challenges. Furthermore, the National Guard is controlled by state governors, many of whom would never comply with an illegal mobilization order. Any attempt to coerce state-controlled forces into a rogue army would immediately result in legal and political backlash.

And even if, somehow, a rogue administration succeeded in handing out millions of rifles and declaring this force a military, that does not make them soldiers. A real military operates through strict discipline, coordination, and a chain of command—not political enthusiasm. History is littered with failed examples of leaders attempting to militarize untrained civilians, from Nazi Germany’s doomed Volkssturm militia in 1945 to Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen paramilitaries in 2003, both of which collapsed the moment they faced real combat. Without the proper training, even well-armed civilians fall apart under pressure—friendly fire incidents skyrocket, command breaks down, and the entire force becomes useless in an actual fight.

Ultimately, the attempt to suddenly create a massive armed force from a political movement would be an unworkable fantasy. It would collapse under its own weight before ever seeing combat. The logistics would fail, the real military and political institutions would refuse to go along, and the force itself would be completely ineffective against any real opposition. In the end, the United States is not structured in a way that allows for a leader to suddenly create a personal army overnight—because every safeguard, logistical reality, and historical precedent points to its absolute failure.

The Culture of Non-Compliance

If there’s one defining characteristic of American culture, it’s defiance in the face of authority. Even under mild government mandates, resistance is widespread. Now imagine the government attempting to impose full-scale martial law, curfews, or movement restrictions by military force. History shows that Americans don’t comply—especially when they see the government as illegitimate or unjust. Large-scale non-compliance, resistance, and outright refusal to obey would make any attempted military occupation impossible.

Here are five major examples from U.S. history that prove the government struggles to impose its will when the population refuses to comply:

1. Watts Riots (1965) – Urban Revolt Against Authority

In August 1965, Los Angeles exploded after a routine traffic stop of a Black motorist escalated into accusations of police brutality. What followed was six days of riots in the Watts neighborhood, with residents setting fires, looting businesses, and attacking police. The National Guard was called in with 14,000 troops, but even then, they struggled to restore order. More than 1,000 buildings were destroyed, 34 people were killed, and over 4,000 arrests were made.

Despite overwhelming force, law enforcement and the National Guard could not control the population until the riots burned themselves out. This was one city, one neighborhood, and it still took nearly a week of sustained military presence to calm the situation. Imagine trying to enforce martial law nationwide.

2. LA Riots (1992) – The Limits of Military Control

When four LAPD officers were acquitted for the beating of Rodney King, Los Angeles erupted in chaos. The riots were even larger than Watts, lasting six days and spreading across multiple neighborhoods. Police were overwhelmed almost immediately. The California National Guard and eventually federal troops from the U.S. Army and Marines were deployed—but even they struggled to contain the violence.

• Over 60 people were killed

• More than 1,000 buildings were burned

• The military imposed curfews, but many ignored them

The government had the full force of the police, National Guard, and military, yet lawlessness continued until it burned itself out. If martial law couldn’t even fully control one city, how would it ever work across an entire country?

3. Minneapolis Riots (2020) – Widespread Defiance Even With Military Presence

Following the death of George Floyd, protests erupted nationwide, but the epicenter was Minneapolis. In the first week alone, over 1,500 businesses were damaged, burned, or looted. The Minnesota National Guard was activated in the largest domestic deployment in state history, yet destruction and defiance continued.

• Curfews were ignored on a massive scale

• Police precincts were abandoned and burned

• Law enforcement and military struggled to regain control

Despite military force, riot police, and curfews, the government could not force the population into submission. The event proved that even with direct military intervention, people will resist, ignore orders, and defy control.

(Another aside - I live in Minnesota, outside of Minneapolis. I would have thought riots and disorder to be highly unlikely here. When the George Floyd incident happened, and the subsequent riots, I was shocked. Shocked by the event itself. Shocked by the subsequent riots. Although not covered nationally, it took months before the police could effectively re-enter the Chicago/Lake area neighborhoods. The areas where the riots occurred wound up a DMZ, patrolled by armed citizens, who kept their homes and businesses from being destroyed by rioters. It was completely out of control for several weeks.)

4. Prohibition (1920-1933) – Nationwide Non-Compliance

Unlike riots, which are spontaneous acts of defiance, Prohibition was a long-term example of sustained national non-compliance. Despite the 18th Amendment making alcohol illegal, Americans ignored the law on a massive scale.

• Bootlegging became a billion-dollar industry

• Speakeasies operated in every major city

• Law enforcement refused to crack down, and juries refused to convict

Eventually, the government had no choice but to repeal Prohibition in 1933 because the law was impossible to enforce. This proves that enforcement becomes meaningless even when the government attempts a sweeping national restriction if the people don’t comply.

5. Bundy Standoff (2014 & 2016) – Armed Resistance to Federal Authority

One of the clearest modern examples of armed non-compliance occurred in Nevada (2014) and Oregon (2016) when rancher Cliven Bundy and his supporters refused to recognize federal authority over grazing lands. When the federal government tried to seize Bundy’s cattle for unpaid grazing fees, hundreds of armed militia members showed up to resist.

• Federal agents were forced to back down rather than escalate into an armed conflict.

• Two years later, Bundy’s supporters occupied a federal wildlife refuge in Oregon, holding it for 41 days before finally surrendering.

• Despite clear violations of federal law, the government was unable to assert control without risking major bloodshed.

The Bundy standoff showed that even a small, armed group can force the federal government to think twice before trying to impose its will by force. If hundreds of militiamen can hold off federal law enforcement, what happens when millions of Americans decide they won’t comply with martial law?

Americans Don’t Obey Orders Just Because They’re Given

From mass urban riots to long-term legal defiance, the consistent theme in U.S. history is that government-imposed control breaks down when enough people refuse to comply. Whether it’s civil unrest, black markets, or armed resistance, the U.S. government has repeatedly struggled to impose order even in localized situations. If it cannot control a single riot, a single city, or a single group of armed individuals, then trying to impose nationwide martial law is beyond impossible.

The government relies on voluntary compliance to function. The moment that compliance is withdrawn, the entire system falls apart. Martial law wouldn’t just fail—it would collapse under the weight of mass defiance, logistical breakdowns, and the very spirit of non-compliance that is woven into the DNA of American history.

The Real Fear: Totalitarianism

When people talk about the fear of martial law under Trump, what they’re really expressing isn’t a fear of tanks rolling down Main Street—it’s a fear of totalitarianism, the slow erosion of democratic norms, and the weaponization of institutions to entrench power. The comparisons to dystopian fiction like The Handmaid’s Tale or The Man in the High Castle aren’t because people think we’ll literally live under a Nazi or theocratic regime overnight, but because they see echoes of authoritarian tactics creeping into the political system.

The real fear isn’t about soldiers patrolling every city block—it’s about the steady manipulation of power to make resistance impossible. That means:

• Election Subversion – The greatest fear with Trump isn’t martial law but the continued undermining of free elections. From pressuring state officials in 2020 to "find" votes to installing loyalists in key election oversight positions, Trump’s approach follows a pattern used by autocrats worldwide: delegitimize elections, weaken oversight, and claim fraud or misconduct by others when losing.

• Weaponization of the Justice System – Whether it’s promises to imprison political opponents or using the DOJ to attack dissenters, Trump’s rhetoric suggests he’d turn the legal system into a tool of personal and political revenge. Autocrats don’t need martial law when they can use prosecutors, courts, and federal agencies to punish critics and protect loyalists.

• Silencing Dissent – Trump has openly encouraged violence against journalists, pushed for the loosening of libel laws to intimidate the press, fired the Inspectors General, and spoken about expanding state control over independent media. Historically, authoritarian regimes don’t need tanks in the streets to suppress free speech—they just make opposition too dangerous to continue.

• Expanding Executive Power – Trump is attempting a massive expansion of presidential power, attempting to push out thousands of career civil servants and replace them with loyalists under “Schedule F”—essentially dismantling institutional checks on executive overreach. There is a non-stop flurry of EOs. The latest attempt at impoundment of nearly all federal assistance boggles the mind and is unprecedented. That act alone is an unprecedented expansion of executive power that will test the limits of the Constitution.

• Militarization of Law Enforcement – While full-scale martial law is unrealistic, Trump has repeatedly floated using the Insurrection Act to deploy troops against civilians, as he attempted to do in 2020. His embrace of paramilitary groups like the Proud Boys and encouragement of armed vigilantism suggests a preference for extrajudicial enforcement rather than direct military control.

Why Martial Law Isn’t the Mechanism of Control

True totalitarian control doesn’t happen through brute-force military takeovers—it happens through systematic control of institutions, law enforcement, courts, and elections. Martial law isn’t necessary when you can rig the system in your favor without firing a shot.

Unlike military dictatorships, modern autocrats prefer to create the illusion of democracy while steadily gutting its actual functions. Trump doesn’t need martial law to consolidate power—he just needs to suppress voter access, fill key positions with loyalists, intimidate opposition, and weaponize federal agencies.

The Bottom Line

The fear of Trump’s return isn’t about tanks and curfews—it’s about the steady erosion of democratic norms. The real danger isn’t martial law—it’s a long-term slide into a system where elections don’t matter, laws are enforced selectively, and opposition is crushed without needing troops in the streets.

So when people say they’re afraid of martial law, what they’re terrified of is an America where democracy exists in name only, and where resistance becomes futile—not because of military control, but because every legal, political, and economic tool has been turned against it.

Conclusion

Martial law in the United States isn’t just improbable—it’s logistically, militarily, and politically impossible. The sheer size of the country, the logistical nightmare of occupation, the deeply ingrained culture of non-compliance, and the lack of a standing force capable of enforcing such a scheme make it a fantasy, not a reality.

But that doesn’t mean there’s nothing to worry about.

The real danger isn’t tanks in the streets—it’s authoritarianism by bureaucracy, manipulation, and coercion. It’s the slow erosion of democratic norms, the bending of institutions to serve personal power, the weaponization of law enforcement, and the steady undermining of electoral integrity. These are real, tangible threats that don’t require martial law, because they operate in the shadows, wrapped in the language of legality and national security.

Modern autocrats don’t need soldiers patrolling neighborhoods to control a country. They just need courts that rule in their favor, legislatures that rubber-stamp their power grabs, a media landscape that silences critics, and a population too exhausted, divided, or intimidated to resist. That’s the kind of authoritarianism that is both real and possible.

So while we can dismiss the idea of a military takeover as Hollywood fiction, we can’t ignore the more subtle, insidious threats that creep into a system and destroy democracy from within. The warning signs are here, and they don’t look like martial law. They look like elections that don’t matter, laws that don’t apply equally, and power that never changes hands—no soldiers required.